

69-4462

8 September 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: DCI Annual Report to the President's Foreign  
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)

1. As you will recall, the Director is required to make an annual report to the PFIAB on "Coordination of the U. S. Foreign Intelligence Effort." Last year you were very helpful in submitting items to be included in this report and I would like to solicit your assistance again this year.

2. The major headings of the report are:

a. Assessment of the organization and functioning of the United States Intelligence Board and its committees.

b. Major problems existing in the coordination of the intelligence community.

c. Significant gaps, deficiencies and undesirable duplication of the various U. S. intelligence agencies.

d. Specific actions to strengthen the effectiveness of the over-all intelligence effort.

3. We have all agreed in the past that these reports should be short and I am asking only for brief summaries of major items as you see them. Rough notes will do if this will make things easier and quicker for you. In this connection, you might find it useful to review last year's report as it finally went forward and I am attaching a copy. Some of the material that you submitted to PPB for this year's Agency report to the PFIAB might be pertinent to the community report.

JOHN A. BROSS  
D/DCI/NIPE

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DDI Contribution to PFIAB Community Report

I. PROBLEMS IN THE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

The single most important existing problem in the coordination of substantive intelligence is the disagreement among CIA, DIA, MACV and CINCPAC, on estimates of enemy strength in Vietnam. The CIA estimate of VC/NVA combat forces at the end of June 1968 is some 40 percent higher than the MACV estimate. In addition, CIA believes that a meaningful estimate of enemy strengths should include other organized irregular elements; e.g. Self Defense Forces and Assault Youth. The military intelligence agencies do not include these groups in their estimates.

The disagreements stem from many factors. A fundamental difference arises from CIA use of estimative techniques that result in higher numbers than those derived by conventional Order-of-Battle techniques. There are also differences on the types of personnel to be included in the various categories of enemy personnel. CIA, for example, includes an estimated 10,000-30,000 full-time staff personnel in the Political Infrastructure that are excluded from the military holdings. Finally, there are serious deficiencies in the amount and reliability

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of data on the identification and personnel strengths of enemy units. Most of the information used to estimate enemy strengths -- KIA, losses, infiltration, recruitment -- is soft and difficult to quantify.

A number of steps are being taken to resolve these problems. The collection effort is being restructured and document exploitation is being intensified. New basic studies of enemy forces are under way in CIA and in Saigon. CIA and DIA working jointly have formulated new definitions and criteria that are now being negotiated with MACV and CINCPAC. On the basis of these proposals CIA and DIA are also undertaking joint estimates of enemy force elements and are attempting to formulate a new attrition study or estimative approach for discussion with MACV and CINCPAC.

## II. DEFICIENCIES AND UNDESIRABLE DUPLICATION

### Intelligence on Vietnam

Thirty-two separate scheduled daily and/or weekly publications or other types of intelligence materials that are devoted wholly or in large part to Vietnam are disseminated within the community. Some of these are largely compilations or summaries. At least half of

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them, however, contain some analytic judgments, and many are heavily weighted toward the analytical.

Some of the materials fulfill recognized needs for publications with different levels of classification, with different intended audiences and with different terms of reference for content and even style. The overlap is, nevertheless, extensive as can be seen by a few examples of the kind of topics that might be treated in more than one of the titles listed in Annex A. A military operation in South Vietnam (such as an attack on Hue, the ambush of an allied column, or movement of North Vietnamese troops) could be dealt with in as many as 27 documents. Infiltration from North Vietnam is regularly handled in 17; and a military supply, or infiltration activity in Laos clearly related to Vietnam would probably be treated in 13. A military development within North Vietnam (such as movement of ground troops, arrival of new naval units, and flight activity by MIG's) could be treated in 16 different issues. A political development in South Vietnam would rate coverage in 16 different places, and information concerning Soviet or Chinese supply efforts on Hanoi's behalf would stand a good chance of being reported in 14 places.

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It should be emphasized that all the intelligence materials just referred to represent only the regularly scheduled daily or weekly output of the community. Total coverage on Vietnam would also include ad hoc memoranda on specific aspects of the problem (such as the Chinese Communist presence in North Vietnam or Hanoi's military strategy) or scheduled reports covering a longer period (such as the monthly report of foreign shipping to North Vietnam). There is additional overlap here.

CIA has discussed the duplication with the State Department. It was agreed, however, that those publications requested by and tailored for a specific readership -- such as the Special Daily Report on Vietnam and Indications of Vietnamese Communist Military Activity -- could not easily be cut off, no matter how much duplication they contain.

Within CIA, there is a proposal to cease publication of the Vietnam Weekly, with the proviso that material in it which is not duplicated elsewhere be included in the daily Situation in Vietnam publication. Also, CIA attempts to reduce duplication by giving much shorter and more selective treatment to subjects such as air strike damage and tactical operations which are covered in great detail in non-CIA publications.

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The Information Explosion

In last year's report, the information explosion was identified as a complex and important problem for the community. Also discussed were related problems: the substantial increases in costs of technologically advanced, complex and massive collection systems, the collection of large amounts of marginal data by these systems, and means for strengthening the intelligence program review process in terms of judging the value of certain information and the worth of the collection program which produces it.

The lack of an effective mechanism for evaluation of the total continues to be a factor in each of these problems and a major weakness in the program review process. Routines do exist within each USIB member agency for analyst evaluation of selected collectors' products, but many of these efforts are autonomous undertakings which in the collective analysts conclude that almost all data produced by a specific collector is of some "value" to someone's individual "priority" needs. These results are often used for little more than justification for continuation of the collection effort being evaluated.

In the meantime, the composite collection effort is unable to obtain the information needed to answer directly

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the critical questions. This inability generates the collection of vast amounts of information that is either indirectly pertinent or at best marginally indicative of the answers to important intelligence problems. [REDACTED]

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As a means of strengthening the intelligence program review process, the community is now developing a display of the allocation of intelligence resources in relation to the problems against which they are targeted. Useful as it will be, however, the display is only a first step in developing management tools for control of the information explosion and rising collection costs. The review process in the end must identify those collection programs which should be increased, continued or terminated. Information on which to base these decisions can come only from an intensive and systematic community-wide means for assessments of collection resources targeted against the same problems, with a view to establishing the relative worth of each.

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III. SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF  
THE OVER-ALL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

The Coordination of Finished Intelligence

Progress has been made in the past year towards community coordination of finished intelligence. Currently a large part of the CIA product receives that coordination.

In April, the Central Intelligence Bulletin was revised in order to expand significantly the information coverage and availability of the only coordinated daily produced within the community. The Bulletin is now published in three editions known as the Black, Red, and White Books.

The Red Book [ ] is essentially the same as the pre-April Bulletin. The Black Book attempts to be a true "all-source" daily and is designed to meet the needs of about three dozen of the government's senior advisers on foreign policy. It contains the more choice items from the Red Book supplemented by information [ ]

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[ ] The SECRET White Book is designed for the "working level", is disseminated in about 1000 copies and is a more useful and timely replacement for the discontinued un-coordinated Current Intelligence Digest. The items in all three are coordinated in the same manner.

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Coordination of Studies on Vietnam

Formal DIA coordination of published CIA studies on the Vietnam War has become increasingly common. These include such subjects as North Vietnamese manpower attrition, military aid to North Vietnam, and logistic activities in Laos. CIA and DIA have jointly produced quarterly analysis of the effects of US bombing programs and a joint report on military aid deliveries to North Vietnam. In the particularly important area of the extent of Viet Cong use of Cambodia as a source of supplies or a sanctuary, CIA has produced two reports that were coordinated with both DIA and Department of State.

Joint working groups have enabled CIA and DIA to resolve some contentious problems concerning the Vietnam War. These include VC/NVA logistic requirements, the expenditure of anti-aircraft ammunition in North Vietnam, the extent of damage to bridges in North Vietnam, and the valuation of military aid received by North Vietnam. Ad hoc working groups now convene regularly on such questions as the strength of VC/NVA logistics and truck-kill totals.

Coordination of General Reports

Notable progress in economic intelligence coordination also occurred during the past year on areas other than Vietnam. Informal coordination with the Department of State was achieved for CIA reports on such diverse subjects

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as problems caused by the Nigerian War, Rhodesian ability to withstand sanctions, economic prospects in Israel, and the impact of US curtailment of aid in Turkey. The Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) structure was used to resolve conflicts. For example, divergent views of AID, State, and CIA on the economic impact of Iranian military aid programs were resolved in this forum.

CIA-DIA collaboration on military intelligence includes the continuing joint study of Soviet capabilities to reinforce in Central Europe. This study involves cooperative pioneering efforts to apply new techniques for reaching high-confidence estimates of the combat readiness and mobility of Soviet line divisions in the western USSR and Eastern Europe. The joint study has stimulated cooperative efforts in related areas. Common methodologies have been adopted, [REDACTED] collection and processing requirements have been shared increasingly on subjects outside the narrow area of capability to reinforce in Central Europe. 25X1

The establishment of ad hoc working groups to reach agreement on identifiable problem areas has proved an exceptionally successful device. The remaining problem concerns the occasional unilateral publication of an

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uncoordinated report on matters of common concern to:  
DIA and CIA. Both Agencies are attempting to eliminate  
even this infrequent happening by an informal exchange  
between production supervisors at the office level on  
research projects scheduled and under way.

CIA and DIA recently reaffirmed the 1965 agreement  
assigning to CIA prime responsibility for military costing  
for national intelligence. This centralization assures  
use of uniform costing methods and factors. The agreement  
also assures that differences in study results reflect  
real differences in foreign programs, not simply differences  
in analytic techniques.

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